Concealed carry is a hot topic in Congress now with a bill coming out of the House called the National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011 (H.R. 822). This bill would extend conceal carry rights across state lines, allowing a legal gun owner who lives in Colorado to freely move about the country with his or her legal firearm and enter, say Illinois. The bill does not change the law in regards to obtaining a permit in your home state, it only prevents the other 49 states from infringing on your Second Amendment rights upon entering their state. As with all issues Second Amendment, our Dave Kopel weighed in on the issue. On Monday he was featured in the Cato Daily Podcast to discuss H.R. 822 and its implications on gun rights and interstate travel rights.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the podcast occurs when Dave recalls a question he received from Rep. Mike Quigley while giving testimony on 822 in the House subcommittee. Rep. Quigley points out that conservatives in Congress like to talk about states’ rights, but when it comes down to it, states’ rights are merely a convenience issue for them. For example, doesn’t H.R. 822 challenge states’ rights?

You’ll have to listen to the Cato podcast to get Dave’s answer. It’s truly fascinating and extremely insightful.

UPDATE: Here is a link to Dave Kopel on the Amy Oliver radio show this morning talking about this issue. Thanks to 1310 KFKA for the audio!

On Tuesday I testified before the U.S. House subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, regarding H.R. 822, which would set up a national system of interstate reciprocity for concealed handgun carry permits. My 24-page written testimony is here. The video of the subcommittee hearing is about and hour and 45 minutes. Nearly all members of the 21-member attended the hearing, and used their opportunity to ask 5 minutes worth of questions. Most of the questions posed to George Mason Law’s Prof. Joyce Malcolm, Philadelphia Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey, and me, were quite thoughtful. Some congressional hearings are just a form of kabuki theater, but in Tuesday’s hearing, Representatives of both parties, and on both sides of the gun issue, seemed to be sincerely trying to learn more. The bill currently has 243 House co-sponsors.

Today South Carolina Republican Senator Jim Demint hosted a forum at which five Republican presidential candidates spoke. The transcript is here.  Each candidate appeared one at a time, and the format allowed for in-depth questions and answers. Among the questioners was Princeton University’s Robert George. Prof. George asked each candidate if he or she would support congressional legislation, under section 5 of the 14th Amendment, to ban abortion. To state the obvious, such legislation would be contrary not only to Roe v. Wade and Penn. v. Casey (abortion rights are protected by section 1 of the 14th Amendment), but also to Boerne v. Flores (Congress cannot use section 5 to protect a right in defiance of direct Supreme Court holding about the particular aspect of the right).  The question explicitly presumed that Roe v. Wade had not been overturned, and that a Human Life Amendment to the Constitution had not been adopted.

The candidates’ answers were as follows:

Bachmann: Yes.

Cain: Yes.

Gingrich: Yes. Cooper v. Aaron‘s assertion of judicial supremacy was wrong. Following the precedent of the first Jefferson administration, I would abolish some federal judgeships. But I am not as bold as Jefferson. “I would do no more than eliminate Judge Barry in San Antonio and the ninth circuit. That’s the most I would go for. (LAUGHTER) (APPLAUSE). But let me say this. That’s part of the national debate. That’s not a rhetorical comment. I believe the legislative and executive branches have an obligation to defend the constitution against judges who are tyrannical and who seek to impose un-American values on the people of the United States.”

Paul: No. Violence and murder should be dealt with by the states. The federal police are already too numerous. I support a bill to deprive lower federal courts of jurisdiction over abortion cases, so that state restrictions on abortion would be immune from judicial review.

Romney: No. I would focus on appointing judges who would return abortion regulation to the states. The George proposal “would create obviously a constitutional crisis. Could that happen in this country? Could there be circumstances where that might occur? I think it’s reasonable that something of that nature might happen someday. That’s not something I would precipitate.”

Personally, I agree with the Romney approach. Moreover, the next President is going to have to address a fiscal crisis that will devastate the United States economy soon if it is not solved. Dealing with the fiscal crisis is going to be quite difficult politically, in part because there are many millions of people who benefit from the current, and unsustainable, levels of federal spending. The tax consumers may be very highly resistant to any reduction in the amount of money that flows to them. So there will be no shortage of national division and acrimony. Thus, 2013 would be an especially bad time to precipitate a constitutional crisis over a social issue. The answers of Romney and Paul displayed prudence, which I think is a very important characteristic for a President, and the answers of Bachmann, Cain, and Gingrich did not.

As for the Ninth Circuit, Gingrich has been saying the same thing since March, according to Politico. I have not found anywhere where he has provided details on this plan, but perhaps it would involve merging the 9th circuit states into the 8th and 10th circuits, since they border the 9th. The Politico article is not entirely clear, but it appears that Gingrich has claimed that he could get rid of the 9th circuit by signing an executive order. This would be plainly unconstitutional, a usurpation of power worthy of impeachment. Article III gives Congress, not the President, the power to “ordain and establish” the inferior federal courts. During the Jefferson administration, the Judiciary Act of 1802 repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801, in which the lame duck Federalist Congress had created many new federal judgeships, to which President John Adams had appointed Federalists in the waning days of his administration. As President Jefferson recognized, the choice to eliminate federal judgeships belongs to Congress, not the President acting by himself. [Update: a commenter says the video (for which a link was not provided) shows that Gingrich was not claiming that he could abolish the 9th Cir. by executive order. I looked on the Internet, and did not find a video of the March 25 Iowa speech by Gingrich. There's a video of a speech earlier that month in Iowa, in which he criticizes the 9th cir. but does not call for its abolition.]

The Independence Institute and the Colorado Springs Gazette are pleased to present the upcoming event in Colorado Springs: A Constitutional Guide to Fighting Federal Overreach.

Come join Independence Institute constitutional scholars David Kopel and Rob Natelson on Friday, September 30 from 2:00 to 6:00 PM at the downtown Antlers Hilton for this important program designed to arm citizens with reliable, factual information they need to help restore liberty and constitutional government in the United States. Participants will also learn how to identify constitutional myths that, intentionally or not, can undermine the cause.

The program discusses:
* Why the Constitution was adopted and what purpose it serves
* Untruths about the Founders and the Founding spread by those who seek to discredit it
* How the Constitution was to be interpreted.
* What key provisions in the Constitution really meant.
* How politicians and courts have destroyed limits on federal power and driven America toward bankruptcy
* How you can use the tools provided by the Constitution to help restore the Founders’ vision
* And much more!

David Kopel is Research Director of the Independence Institute and one of the nation’s leading experts on the Second Amendment. The author of numerous books and articles, he also teaches Advanced Constitutional Law at the University of Denver.

Rob Natelson is Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence at the Independence Institute. He was formerly professor of constitutional law at the University of Montana, and has authored numerous books and articles, including the 2010 book, The Original Constitution: What It Actually Said and Meant.

Register online here. Or Call Mary at (303) 279-6536, Ext. 102. Cost is twenty dollars and space is limited.

This week Scotusblog is running a series of essays, “The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.” Contributors so far are Dawn Johnson (Indiana U.), Bradley Joondeph (Santa Clara U., and manager of a very useful blog on the ACA litigation), Bob Levy (Cato), Charles Fried (Harvard), and me. There are many more essays still to come, that will be posted throughout the week. My essay examines some of the questions that the Court will face in granting cert., the tax issue, and the issue of the state coercion in Obamacare’s new Medicaid mandates. Conspirators Adler, Kerr, and Somin are among some other scholars who have essays that should be posted soon.

At CNN, Politico, National Review Online’s “The Corner” blog, and at the Susan B. Anthony List website, you can read the developing controversy over some Republican presidential candidates’ refusal to sign the SBA Lists’ “2012 Pro-Life Citizen’s Pledge.”

Signers thus far are Bachmann, Gingrich, Pawlenty, Paul, and Santorum. The items on the pledge are:

FIRST, to nominate to the U.S. federal bench judges who are committed to restraint and applying the original meaning of the Constitution, not legislating from the bench;

SECOND, to select only pro-life appointees for relevant Cabinet and Executive Branch positions, in particular the head of National Institutes of Health, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Health & Human Services;

THIRD, to advance pro-life legislation to permanently end all taxpayer funding of abortion in all domestic and international spending programs, and defund Planned Parenthood and all other contractors and recipients of federal funds with affiliates that perform or fund abortions;

FOURTH, advance and sign into law a Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act to protect unborn children who are capable of feeling pain from abortion.

Of the candidates who have refused to sign, Mitt Romney objects because the wording of the demand to cut on federal abortion funding could be construed to stop federal aid to many hospitals; further, he refuses to make pro-life a litmus test for his executive branch appointments, as long as the appointees are willing to abide by (President) Romney’s own pro-life views. Herman Cain says he would “sign” the pain bill, but will not take the pledge to “advance” the bill, because “Congress must advance the legislation,” and he must have “respect for the balance of power and the role of the presidency.”

Thus, of the announced candidates, we have only Gov. Gary Johnson who might have constitutional scruples about the federal pain bill.

The Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, which has been enacted in several states, requires that physicians provide a woman who is at least 20 weeks pregnant, and who is seeking an abortion, with information to obtain informed consent about the pain that the fetus will feel during the abortion.

The PCUCPA is probably constitutional under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, since it does not ban pre-viability abortions, and the lower courts have not generally found other informed consent laws for abortion to be an “undue burden,” as Casey defines that term.

However, a federal PCUCPA is plainly unconstitutional under the “original meaning” of the Constitution, which judges appointed by SBA Pledge signers would presumably uphold. The federal version of PCUCPA is S. 314, introduced by Sen. Mike Johanns (R-Neb.). After the definitions section of the proposed statute, the bill states: “Any abortion provider in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, who knowingly performs any abortion of a pain-capable unborn child, shall comply with the requirements of this title.”

Federal abortion control under the purported authority of congressional power “To regulate Commerce...among the several States” is plainly unconstitutional under the original meaning of the interstate commerce.

Even under the lax (but non-infinite) version of the interstate commerce power which the Court articulated in Lopez,  a federal ban on partial-birth abortion is dubious, as Glenn Reynolds and I argued in a Connecticut Law Review article. Indeed, in the 5–4 Supreme Court decision upholding the federal ban, Gonzales v. Carhart, Justices Thomas and Scalia, who voted in the majority to uphold the ban as not violating the Casey abortion right, concurred to point out “that whether the Act constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause is not before the Court. The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is outside the question presented; and the lower courts did not address it.”

In other words, if the attorneys who challenged the federal ban on partial-birth abortions had been willing to raise all plausibile constitutional claims, instead of losing the case 4–5 they probably could have won 6–3, by assembling a coalition of 4 strongly pro-abortion-rights Justices, plus Scalia and Thomas on the commerce issue.

When we get beyond Lopez, and truly look at original meaning, then the unconstitutionality of the federal PCUCPA is obvious. In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall explained that “health laws of every description” are outside the scope of the federal commerce power. The statement has been cited with approval by other Supreme Court justices at least 20 times. As Wickard v. Filburn observed, the Marshall opinion in Gibbons “described the Federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded.” Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). (For more on Marshall’s views about federal health control, see this article by Rob Natelson and me.)

Marshall’s opinion in Gibbon may be considered the outer boundary of any originalist interpretation of the interstate commerce power. What doctors tell patients before providing abortions is obviously not interstate commerce, all the more so since the vast majority of patients do not cross state lines to obtain abortions.

Yale’s Jack Balkin makes the argument that in the original meaning, “commerce” means “intercourse,” and thus the original meaning allows a vast amount of federal regulation of intra-state, non-economic activity. Rob Natelson and I explained the errors in this theory in an on-line article for the Michigan Law Review.

Presumably the Republican signers of the SBA pledge would not assert that the appointment of judges who accept Balkin’s “commerce = intercourse” theory of original meaning would comport with President’s pledge to appoint judges who would follow original meaning. All of the Republican presidential candidates have said that the Obamacare individual mandate to purchase expensive congressionally-designed health insurance from the congressionally-favored insurance oligopoly is unconstitutional. Balkin’s intercourse theory, however, would support the constitutionality of the mandate.

The signing of the SBA pledge by Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.) is particularly disappointing, since Paul has usually made a point of being scrupulous about federal powers. Indeed, Paul was the sole “pro-gun” Representative who voted against the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, a federal statute which outlawed lawsuits, in federal and state courts, against the manufacturers, wholesalers, and lawful retailers of firearms for guns which were lawfully sold and properly functioning. Paul’s argument was that the law exceeded the federal power to regulate interstate commerce; I disagree, since the undisputed original purpose of the interstate commerce power was to empoower Congress to act against state barriers to interstate commerce. The anti-gun lawsuits were plainly an effort to use fanciful tort theories to damage the entire national market in firearms, by imposing on that market many restrictions which had been considered and rejected by Congress and the state legislatures.

Thus, in regard to the anti-gun lawsuits, Paul’s scruples were mistaken, in my view, but he deserves credit for being sincerely scrupulous. I wish that he, and the rest of the Reublican presidential field, kept their constitutional scruples intact regarding federal anti-abortion legislation.

While the federal PCUCPA does not invoke section 5 of the 14th Amendment as a basis for the legislation, it is possible to construct an argument that some federal anti-abortion laws could be based on that power. However, it’s hard to base such an argument on the original meaning of the 14th Amendment, since there is not a shred of evidence in the 1865–68 history of the creation and ratification of the 14th Amendment (nor in the immediate post-ratification period, nor for nearly a century after ratification) that anyone imagined that the 14th Amendment empowered Congress to enact abortion-control laws, or guaranteed abortion rights.

So if a Republican who signs the SBA pledge is elected President, and he or she adheres to item 1 in the SBA pledge, appointing judges who adhere to the Constitution’s original meaning, then those judges will uphold state versions of the PCUCPA while declaring unconstitutional a federal PCUCPA.

Probably no part of the Constitution has been so misunderstood as the Necessary and Proper Clause, which is located at Article I, Section 8, Clause 18. The Necessary and Proper Clause has been called both an “elastic clause” and a “sweeping clause,” and many have claimed it grants vast power to Congress. For example, a recent Supreme Court case, United States v. Comstock, stated that the “Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation.”

In fact, most federal regulations today are justified by the Necessary and Proper Clause. They are said to be within Congress’s Interstate Commerce Power— but within not the core Commerce Clause (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States”). Rather, they are said to be supported by the accompanying authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the power to regulate commerce.

Now, here’s the irony of the situation: Far from granting “broad authority” to Congress, the truth is that Necessary and Proper Clause grants no power at all. It is placed at the end of Article I, Section 8 as an explanation—that is, a “recital.” A recital is a passage in a legal document that has no substantive legal effect, but serves to inform the reader of assumptions or facts behind the document. Another example of a recital in the Constitution is the Preamble.

In recent years, several constitutional scholars have investigated the true meaning of the Clause, and have worked to correct the record. The process began with an article written by Professor Gary L. Lawson and Patricia B. Granger: The Proper Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L. J. 267 (1994). It focused on the meaning of “proper.” A decade later, I delved into the historical record. I found that wording of this kind was extremely common in eighteenth-century documents granting power from one person to another. I also found the courts had issued cases interpreting this language, and that the Founders had adopted the courts’ interpretation. See articles here and here.

Finally, Professors Lawson and I teamed up with two other noted scholars, Geoff Miller, and Guy Seidman, and wrote a book on the subject. (We all have differing political views, by the way.) The book is called The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and it was published last year by Cambridge University Press.

Here’s what we found:

* The Clause is a mere recital. It informs the reader how to interpret congressional authority. It does not grant any power.

* The term “necessary” tells the reader that congressional authority is interpreted according to the intent behind the document, rather than very strictly (as the Articles of Confederation required).

* The Clause does this by telling the reader that the legal “doctrine of incidental powers” applies to the Constitution. This means that Congress can regulate certain activities outside the strict reading of its powers, but ONLY IF this ancillary regulation is (1) subordinate to an express power, and (2) a customary or necessary way of carrying out the express power. For example, in regulating commerce, Congress can require accurate labels on goods to be shipped in interstate commerce. But Congress cannot regulate the entire manufacturing process.

* The word “proper” means that a law must comply with Congress’s fiduciary (public trust) responsibilities. A law is not “proper”—and is therefore unconstitutional— if it invidiously discriminates among people, violates individual rights, is utterly irrational, or exceeds congressional authority.

* Contrary to prevailing legal mythology, Chief Justice Marshall’s famous case of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) did not stretch the Clause, but applied it properly and with due regard for its limitations.

Recently, Dave Kopel, the Independence Institute Research Director, filed an amicus curiae brief in the most important anti-Obamacare lawsuit. He did so on behalf of Professors Lawson, Seidman, and me. The goal? To correct the record and inform the courts what the Necessary and Proper Clause REALLY means.

If you’ve ever dreamed of being in the same room as not one, but TWO real life geniuses, then you’ll want to attend our program for the grassroots on Sunday, May 15th, from 1:15 to 5pm at the Red Rocks Community College. Both constitutional law professor Rob Natelson and our Second Amendment expert and constitutional law professor Dave Kopel will be educating the class on how to use our constitution to fight federal overreach. By the time the program is over, you will know the constitutional information you need to restore liberty and constitutional government in America! And maybe have a higher IQ through osmosis.

The program discusses:
* Why the Constitution was adopted and what purpose it serves
* Untruths spread about the Founders and the Founding spread by those who seek to discredit it
* How the Constitution was to be interpreted.
* What key provisions in the Constitution really meant.
* How politicians and courts have destroyed limits on federal power and driven America toward bankruptcy
* How you can use the tools provided by the Constitution to restore the Founders’ vision
* And much more!

Please go to our event page here for more detailed information including the class schedule. Space is extremely limited so please RSVP now!

Using the Constitution’s system of a “convention to propose amendments” is likely the only way we’ll ever get a balanced budget amendment, a federal single-subject rule, or other reforms Congress won’t pass. Opponents of the process, however, try to convince people that a convention to propose amendments is a “constitutional convention” (which it is not) and that it could “run away” (which it almost certainly can’t).

Recently I traveled to Indianapolis to testify before the Indiana legislature. While there, I learned that opponents of an amendments convention are circulating questions about a convention, apparently designed to “stump” proponents.

Frankly, when I read what are supposed to be tough questions, I laughed out loud. All the questions are answered easily if you know the history and law applicable to such a convention.

The author of the questions obviously didn’t. He introduced them with this statement: “No convention has been held since 1787, and after two hundred years that experience has little relevance.”

The statement is ridiculous. Americans have held hundreds, perhaps thousands, of conventions since 1787. They also have amended the Constitution 27 times, and state legislatures have submitted hundreds of applications for an Article V conventions. This and related experience is a valuable source of precedent. And the legal disputes that arose out of this activity comprise a valuable source of decided case law.

But if what the author meant is that no interstate convention has been held since 1787, then the statement is still ridiculous because the Founding Generation’s copious experience with both interstate and intrastate conventions has tremendous constitutional and practical relevance. This is because the language and powers bestowed by Article V carry meanings and incidental powers fixed by Founding-Era custom and law, particularly the law of agency.

[By the way, that is not the sheet's only inaccuracy---another is the old myth that the 1787 convention was a runaway.]

Anyway, here are the 11 questions the author poses, with answers to each. For further information, see my writings, linked on this website. You can supplement them with the leading book on Article V conventions, Russell Caplan’s Constitutional Brinkmanship (Oxford University Press, 1988). Some of the book’s conclusions and language have been superseded, but it remains a valuable antidote to claimed uncertainty.

1. How is the validity of applications from the states to be determined?
A. Initially by Congress, although congressional decisions are subject to judicial review.

2. How specific must the state legislatures be in asking for amendment?
A. The legislatures may apply either for an unrestricted convention or one devoted to particular subject matter. There is no rule as to specificity, other than that the legislatures may not dictate specific wording to the convention.

3. Must all the applications be in identical language?
A. No. It is enough if they identify the same problem(s) or subject-matter(s). However, prudence suggests that state legislatures coordinate with one another.

4. Within what time period must the required number of applications be received?
A. Since adoption of the 27th amendment, it is clear that there is no time period. Because, however, some are still claiming that applications can go “stale,” prudence suggests that a campaign be completed within a decade or so. (The application campaign for direct election of senators took 14 years.

5. Can Congress refuse to call a convention on demand of two-thirds of the states, and if it does, can it be compelled to act by the courts?
A. No, Congress may not refuse, and the courts can compel it to act.

6. Who are the delegates, and how are they to be chosen?
A. Delegates are representatives of their respective state legislatures, and are chosen as state law directs.

7. Can the convention act by a simple majority vote, or would a two-thirds majority be required, as in Congress, for proposing an amendment?
A. The convention acts by a simple majority of the represented states. The convention may, by a simple majority of the represented states, alter that voting rule.

8. How is a convention to be financed, and where does it meet?
A. A convention for proposing amendments is a conclave of state delegates. It therefore is financed by the states. Congress, in the convention call, specifies the initial meeting place. The convention may alter that meeting place.

9. May the convention propose more than one amendment?
A. Yes—but only if they are all within the agenda of the convention, as prescribed by the applying states.

10. Is there a time limit on the proceedings, or can the convention act as a continuing body?
A. There is no fixed time limit—the convention can meet until it decides whether to propose amendments and which ones to propose. But a convention is, by definition, not a continuing body. It has no authority beyond proposing amendments within the subject matter prescribed in the applications, and once that is performed, it must adjourn. Additionally, states may recall and/or replace their delegates at any time.

11. Can controversies between Congress and the convention over its powers be decided by the courts?
A. Controversies over the scope of the convention’s powers may be decided by the courts. However, the states, not Congress, fix the scope of such powers. The most likely area of controversy between Congress and the convention would be if the convention suggests an amendment that Congress believes is outside the convention’s agenda as fixed in the state applications. If (as is proper) Congress then refused to prescribe a “Mode of Ratification” for the suggested amendment, the courts could resolve the dispute.

Over at Balkinization, guest blogger Michael Greve offers an excellent post explaining the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s pending cert. petition in a case challenging the tobacco cartel. In short, the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement for the lawsuits initiated by some state Attorneys General against the largest tobacco companies is a violation of the Compacts Clause. Article I, sect. 10, of the Constitution list some things that states may never do, and other things that states may only do with the consent of Congress.  The Compact Clause mandates: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress...enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State...”

As Greve explains, the Supreme Court has not done much to enforce the Compact Clause for the last quarter century; but Greve points out that in 2009, the Roberts Court enforced another provision in section 10 (the Tonnage Clause) which had last been heard from in 1935. Even the Court’s most lax interpretations of the Compact Clause have not left the clause without meaning, and Greve persuasively argues that if the Compact Clause has any legal meaning, it must prohibit the MSA.

The CEI website has a page with links to various documents in the case, including an amicus brief in support of the cert. petition, signed by the impressively diverse and brilliant team of Kathleen Sullivan, Richard Epstein, and Alan Morrison.

As a practical matter, the MSA is a scheme by which a few tobacco giants, all of which were accused of decades of substantial misdeeds, including fraud, were allowed to create a system to cartelize the tobacco market, and to insulate their market shares against competition from smaller companies which had committed no wrong-doing. The VC’s Todd Zywicki participated in an antitrust professor amicus brief in favor of the cert. petition. That brief points out that the tobacco cartel is a classic violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. As the Sherman Act has been interpreted, price-fixing is per se illegal, and price-fixing is the only antitrust violation which frequently results in criminal prosecution. While some precedents allow Sherman Act violations if they are part of a regulatory system supervised by a state, the antitrust professors argue that the tobacco cartel doe not fit within the scope of exceptions which have been authorized by Supreme Court precedent.